Montana Law Review
Volume 65
Issue 2 Summer 2004

Article 6

7-2004

State v. Robinson: Free Speech, Or Itchin' for a Fight?
Thomas W. Korver
Student, University of Montana School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Thomas W. Korver, State v. Robinson: Free Speech, Or Itchin' for a Fight?, 65 Mont. L. Rev. (2004).
Available at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol65/iss2/6

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks at University of Montana. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Montana Law Review by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks at University of Montana.
For more information, please contact scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.

Korver: State v. Robinson

NOTE

STATE V. ROBINSON: FREE SPEECH, OR ITCHIN'
FOR A FIGHT?
Thomas W. Korver*1

It is no harm to be an ass,
if one is content to bray and not kick.2

I. INTRODUCTION
Assume a pedestrian is crossing the street and sees a
marked patrol car at the stoplight. The pedestrian looks at the
officer in the car and says "fucking pig." The officer parks his
car, approaches the pedestrian and asks if there is something
the pedestrian wants to talk about. The pedestrian replies "fuck
you asshole." Is the pedestrian exercising a First Amendment
right of free speech or are the words wholly unprotected by the
U.S. Constitution? In the case of State v. Robinson, the
Montana Supreme Court faced that exact question with those
* University of Montana School of Law, class of 2005. I would like to express my
gratitude to Professor Andrew King-Ries for his insight and guidance, and my colleagues
on the Montana Law Review for their support and editorial assistance.
1. Author's Note: This case note contains profane language that may be offensive to
sensitive readers. All profanities used herein are verbatim quotes from the referenced
opinions and are not additions by the author.
2. MARK TWAIN, PERSONAL RECOLLECTIONS OF JOAN OF ARC 83 (Oxford Univ. Press
1996) (1896).
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precise facts and held that the words spoken to the officer were
not protected by the First Amendment.3 The next question is,
was the court right?
Any discussion of freedom of speech must begin with the
recognition that it is perhaps the most hallowed and essential
fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution. It is the
hallmark upon which many other constitutional rights are
5
effectuated, 4 and is an essential element of a free society.
Concomitant with the guarantee of free speech is the right of
individuals to criticize the government and governmental
officials in ways that may appear to the general citizenry to be
6
distasteful or offensive.
The free speech rights guaranteed by the First Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution are not, however, absolute. Speech
constituting libel, slander, perjury, conspiracy and treason are
not afforded protection under the First Amendment. 7 Neither
are what the U.S. Supreme Court introduced as "fighting words"
over sixty years ago. 8 The fighting words doctrine is based on
the premise that there are words which are so lewd, libelous or
insulting that simply speaking them will cause injury or a
breach of peace. Such words are not protected as communication or opinion under the Constitution because they have little
social value and, thus, do not fall within the purview of First
Amendment free speech. 9
Twenty-five years after the U.S. Supreme Court announced
the fighting words doctrine, it had occasion to determine the
application of fighting words spoken to police officers. 10 The

3. 2003 MT 364, 319 Mont. 82, 82 P.3d 27.
4. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937), overruled on other grounds by
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (freedom of speech "is the matrix, the
indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom").
5. First Unitarian Church of Los Angeles v. County of Los Angeles, 357 U.S. 513,
530 (1958) (Black, J., concurring) (the freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment
"are absolutely indispensable for the preservation of a free society").
6. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 344 (1957), overruled on other grounds by
Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978) (the First Amendment preserves a free society
by "leav[ing] the way wide open for people to favor, discuss, advocate, or incite causes
and doctrines however obnoxious and antagonistic such views may be to the rest of us").
7. Aviva 0. Wertheimer, The First Amendment Distinction Between Conduct and
Content:A Conceptual Framework For UnderstandingFighting Words Jurisprudence,63
FORDHAM L. REV. 793, 793-94 (1994).
8. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
9. Id. at 572.
10. Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451 (1987).
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Court established the principle that the fighting words doctrine
should be more narrowly construed when verbal abuse is
directed toward law enforcement officers."
It reasoned that
more deference should be given to First Amendment protections
in this context due to the lessened possibility officers will
respond violently to fighting words given the training they
receive. 12
Some sixteen years later, the Montana Supreme Court was
presented with the Robinson case. The court deemed "fucking
pig" to be fighting words and, as such, not protected speech
under the First Amendment. 13 The court further held it to be
irrelevant whether the recipient of the words is an ordinary
14
citizen or a police officer trained to exercise restraint.
This Note argues the Montana Supreme Court failed to
correctly apply U.S. Supreme Court precedent in concluding the
speech uttered in Robinson was fighting words not protected by
the First Amendment. Part II outlines the history of the First
Amendment and the fighting words doctrine. It also discusses
the application of fighting words to law enforcement officers in
both federal and state courts. Part III discusses the Montana
Supreme Court's decision in Robinson and the court's reasoning
in concluding the speech constituted fighting words. Part IV
analyzes Robinson and compares it with the precedent of the
U.S. Supreme Court. Part V offers the conclusion that, despite
good intentions and possibly the best result for a civil society,
the Montana Supreme Court failed to correctly apply binding
federal precedent to the Robinson case.
II. FREE SPEECH AND THE FIGHTING WORDS
EXCEPTION
A. FirstAmendment Protections
The extent to which speech has been protected under the
First Amendment has not remained static. The political and
social climate of the time period often determined the extent of
First Amendment protections. Much like President Lincoln's

11.
12.
13.
14.

Id.
Id. at 462, 471-72.
Robinson, 24.
Id. 21.
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suspension of the writ of habeas corpus during the Civil War,
often free speech has been suppressed during times of military
actions or national emergencies. 15 The Supreme Court has also
yielded to the dictates of the times in determining whether
speech is to be protected or repressed.
The origins of free speech in America may, like so many
other freedoms protected by the Constitution, be traced to a
negative perception of the laws of England where criticism of the
government was seen as a crime. Early English courts saw
criticism of the government and government officials as
seditious libel to be punishable by law, irrespective of whether
the allegedly libelous statement may have been true. 16 Colonial
American experience was little different. The colonies were
often unwelcoming to dissident speech concerning the affairs of
government and, as in England, seditious libel was punishable
17
by law.
The First Amendment was ratified in 1791 and provides
that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances." What the framers meant by "freedom of
speech" and the lengths to which they intended that freedom to
be protected is uncertain.' 8 Accordingly, it has been the task of
the U.S. Supreme Court to determine what exactly freedom of
speech means and what the right encompasses.
Shortly after ratification of the First Amendment, the first
inroads into limiting free speech had already begun as America
faced the possibility of a war with France. 19 In 1798, Congress
passed the Alien and Sedition Act prohibiting the publication of

15. See, e.g., Margaret A. Blanchard, "Why Can't We Ever Learn?" Cycles of
Stability, Stress and Freedom ofExpression in United States History, 7 COMM. L. & POL'Y
347 (2002).

16. Sedition is "[an agreement, communication, or other preliminary activity aimed
at inciting treason or some lesser commotion against public authority." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1361 (7th ed. 1999). See also Rex v. Tutchin, 90 Eng. Rep. 1133, Holt 424
(Q.B. 1704); 14 HOWELL'S STATE TRIALS 1095, 1128 (1704) ("If men should not be called
to account for possessing the people with an ill opinion of the Government, no
Government can subsist; for it is very necessary for every Government, that the people
should have a good opinion of it.").
17. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 893 (2d ed. 2002).
18.

Id. at 893-94; see also DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 9 (2d ed. 2003).

19.

FARBER, supra note 18, at 57.

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol65/iss2/6

4

2004

Korver: State v. Robinson

STATE V. ROBINSON

389

"false, scandalous, and malicious writing or writings" with the
intention of defaming or exciting the people against the
government, the President or Congress. 20 The constitutionality
of the Alien and Sedition Act was never brought before the
Supreme Court, and it was repealed in 1801. However, it has
been suggested that the Court may have upheld the Act based
21
on its application by several Justices sitting on circuit courts.
Following repeal of the Alien and Sedition Act, there was little
debate concerning freedom of speech until just prior to the Civil
22
War when states began to suppress the speech of abolitionists.
The constitutionality of these state efforts was also not
addressed by the Supreme Court. 23 In fact, it was not until 1925
that the Court ruled free speech was a fundamental First
Amendment "liberty" protected by the due process provisions of
the Fourteenth Amendment and, thus, applicable to state
24
action.
After the Civil War, discussion of free speech again quieted
until the United States neared another military action, World
War I. Congress, concerned with the spreading of opinions in
opposition to the war, passed legislation designed to quiet those
opinions. 25 The Supreme Court was asked to rule on the
constitutionality of those laws from 1919 to 1921 in six major
cases. 26 The majority of the Court held the right to free speech
was not absolute and deferred to congressional judgment to
determine when speech could be considered seditious and

20. Ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596, Act of July 14, 1798 (expired 1801).
21. FARBER, supra note 18, at 57.
22. Christopher P. Keleher, Double Standards: The Suppression of Abortion
Protesters'Free Speech Rights, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 825, 828-29 (2002).
23. Id. at 829.
24. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) ("we may and do assume that
freedom of speech and of the press . . . are among the fundamental personal rights and
'liberties' protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from
impairment by the States"); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[nlo State shall make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws").
25. See Espionage Act of 1917, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217, (repealed 1948) (current version
at 18 U.S.C. § 793 (2000)); Sedition Act of 1918, ch. 75, 40 Stat. 553 (repealed 1921).
26. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S.
211 (1919); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Schaefer v. United States, 251
U.S. 466 (1920); Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239 (1920); United States ex rel.
Milwaukee Soc. Democratic Publ'g Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407 (1921).
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detrimental to war efforts. 27 However, a minority of justices
became distressed with the direction of the Court and criticized
28
the majority for its restrictive position.
The opinions of the minority justices took hold in the late
1930s as the Court began to adopt a more expansive view of free
speech, including cases protecting the rights of Jehovah's
Witnesses and labor leaders. 29 This expansive view persisted for
the next two decades. 30 Again, however, freedom of speech was
challenged during the McCarthy era when Congress passed the
Smith Act making it unlawful to "knowingly or willfully
advocate, abet, advise or teach the duty, necessity, desirability
or propriety of overthrowing or destroying any government in
the United States by force or violence, or by assassination of any
officer of such government." 31
Challenges to the constitutionality of the Smith Act were brought before the Court in
several cases. 32 While the Court did not rule the Smith Act per
se unconstitutional, it did place limits on the means by which
33
advocacy proscribed in the Act could be prosecuted.
Again the tide turned in the late 1950s and 1960s as the
Court was willing to protect the speech of anti-war protesters
and demonstrators. 34 Since that time, the Court generally
expanded the right of free speech, finding it to encompass many
disparate rights such as the right to burn crosses as well as the
35
right to burn flags.
B. Fighting Words Exception
In the early 1940s, Walter Chaplinsky, a Jehovah's Witness,
was distributing literature on the streets of Rochester, New
36
Hampshire and boisterously denouncing all religion as rackets.

27.

JOAN BISKUPIC & ELDER WITT, THE SUPREME COURT & INDMIDUAL RIGHTS 24

(3d ed. 1997).
28. Keleher, supra note 22, at 830.
29. FARBER, supra note 18, at 12.
30. Id. at 62.
31. Alien Registration (Smith) Act of 1940, Act of June 28, 1940, ch. 439, § 2, 54 Stat.
670 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (2000)).
32. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Yates v. United States,
354 U.S. 298 (1957); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
33. See Yates, 354 U.S. 298; Scales, 367 U.S. 203.
34. FARBER, supra note 18, at 12.
35. Id. at 12-13.
36. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 569-70.
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Rochester citizens complained to the city marshal who told them
that Chaplinsky's actions were lawful, but the marshal warned
Chaplinsky about the restless crowd.3 7 After the disturbance
escalated, a traffic officer hustled Chaplinsky toward the police
38
station without informing Chaplinsky he was under arrest.
The city marshal was returning to the scene of the disturbance
and, upon meeting Chaplinsky and the traffic officer, again
warned Chaplinsky about the crowd. 39 Chaplinsky then told the
marshal, "'You are a God damned racketeer' and 'a damned
Fascist and the whole government of Rochester are Fascists or
40
agents of Fascists."'
Consequently, Chaplinsky was arrested for violating a
Rochester Code provision which prohibited persons from
addressing:
any offensive, derisive or annoying word to any other person who
is lawfully in any street or other public place, nor call him by any
offensive or derisive name, nor make any noise or exclamation in
his presence and hearing with intent to deride, offend or annoy
him, or to prevent him from pursuing his lawful business or
41
occupation.

Chaplinsky argued that the Rochester Code violated his
First Amendment right to free speech. 42 The Supreme Court
rejected Chaplinsky's argument and held that the code was
sufficiently narrow and limited in scope as to punish specific
verbal conduct without impairing communication protected
under the First Amendment. 43 In coming to this determination,
the Court fashioned the scope of the fighting words exception:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of
speech, the prevention and punishment of which has never been
thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the
lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or
'fighting' words-those which by their very utterance inflict injury
or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has been
well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any
exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to
truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 570.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 569-70.
Id. at 569.
Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571.
Id. at 573-74.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2004

7

392

Montana Law Review, Vol. 65 [2004], Iss. 2, Art. 6

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

Vol. 65

4
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.
The Court's analysis set out two main justifications for the
exclusion of fighting words from First Amendment protection:
the words themselves are inherently inciteful or capable of
45
causing harm, and they have little or no value as speech.
Further, because fighting words are "no essential part of any
exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step
to truth," they may be beyond First Amendment protection as
they are non-speech. 46 The test for when speech constitutes
fighting words outlined by the Court is "what men of common
intelligence would understand would be words likely to cause an
47
average addressee to fight."
As noted, the Court was willing to construe the Rochester
Code as sufficiently narrow to survive constitutional scrutiny.
In addition, the Court has never overturned Chaplinsky.
Accordingly, one might expect to find similar results in
subsequent decisions. However, in the sixty years since the
Supreme Court announced the fighting words doctrine it has
never upheld a conviction involving fighting words. 48 The Court
has overturned convictions based on various factual scenarios
including separate cases involving: wearing a jacket stating
"Fuck the Draft" in a county courthouse; 49 an antiwar protester
blocking a military draft center and telling a police officer
"'White son of a bitch, I'll kill you.' 'You son of a bitch, I'll choke
you to death,"' and another officer "You son of a bitch, if you ever
put your hands on me again, I'll cut you all to pieces";5 0 a citizen
in a school board meeting, which included approximately forty
children, who used the word "motherfucking" to describe "the
51
teachers, the school board, the town and his own country";
52
burning a cross in an African-American family's yard; and
telling a crowd being controlled by police "'We'll take the fucking

44.
45.
46.
1527,
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 571-72.
Id. at 572.
Id.; Michael J. Mannheimer, The Fighting Words Doctrine, 93 COLUM. L. REV.
1536 (1993).
Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573.
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, at 968.
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901 (1972).
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
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street later,' or 'We'll take the fucking street again.' 53 It is clear
the doctrine has expanded far beyond the proclamations in
Chaplinsky given the wide range of speech the Court has
excluded from the fighting words doctrine.
As separate Supreme Court decisions have massaged the
fighting words doctrine over time, one can find five elements
that must be met in order for speech to be unprotected:
[F]irst, the words must constitute a direct personal insult; second,
the words must be directed to the addressee personally and
individually, and may not be a generalized insult addressed to a
large group or indiscriminately to the world at large; third, the
words must be addressed to the person face-to-face; fourth, the
words must be of such a nature as to be likely to prqvoke the
average addressee to an immediate violent response; and finally,
the words must be likely to provoke the actual addressee to
54
violence in light of all the circumstances.

Given the narrow range of verbal acts that are prohibited by
the fighting words doctrine, some have called for its revision and
others have made calls for its abandonment. 55 Nevertheless, the
fighting words doctrine tailored under Chaplinsky and its
progeny remain good law and, more importantly, the law of the
56
land.
C. The NarrowerApplication to Police Officers
One of the elements the Supreme Court outlined in
Chaplinsky is that the offensive words must be likely to provoke
the "average addressee" to fight. 57 While the Chaplinsky Court
indicated that offensive is determined in the context of the
average addressee, it upheld a statute indicating the addressee
to whom the words are spoken should be considered when
determining whether the act is forbidden. Specifically, the
statute at issue in Chaplinsky provided that the words must
"have a direct tendency to cause acts of violence by the person to
whom, individually, the remark is addressed."5 8 In addition, the

53. Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973).
54. Mannheimer, supra note 46, at 1551.
55. See, e.g. Wendy B. Reilly, Note, Fightingthe Fighting Words Standard:A Call for
its Destruction, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 947 (2000); Note, The Demise of the Chaplinsky
FightingWords Doctrine:An Argument for its Interment, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1129 (1993).
56. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, at 968.
57. 315 U.S. at 573.
58. Id.
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Court subsequently solidified its requirement that the effect on
the particular addressee must be considered when determining
whether verbal acts constitute fighting words. 59 Thus, the Court
suggested the circumstances in which the words are made and
to whom the words are addressed is relevant in determining
whether verbal acts are fighting words. This has led to much
debate and interpretation by the courts as to whether it is the
words themselves which can be proscribed or whether a
distinction must be made based on the recipient, often called the
60
content versus conduct distinction.
It is within this context that the Supreme Court first
suggested application of the fighting words doctrine may require
a different analysis when the addressee of the words is a law
enforcement official. In Lewis v. City of New Orleans, the Court
overturned a breach of the peace conviction against an
individual alleged to have addressed profanities toward a police
officer. 61
The basis of the Court's decision rested on a
determination that the code at issue was constitutionally
overbroad. 62 In a concurring opinion, however, Justice Powell
suggested that the fighting words exception may demand
narrower application in cases when the words are addressed to
law enforcement officials. 63 He reasoned "a properly trained
officer may reasonably be expected to 'exercise a higher degree of
restraint' than the average citizen, and thus be less likely to
64
respond belligerently to 'fighting words.'
Thirteen years later, the Court decided City of Houston v.
Hill in which it adopted Justice Powell's previous view. 65 After
Hill observed two police officers speaking to one of his friends,
66
Hill shouted, "Why don't you pick on somebody your own size?"
One of the officers asked, "[Aire you interrupting me in my
official capacity as a Houston police officer?"6 7 Hill responded,

59. Gooding, 405 U.S. at 524.
60. For a discussion of the content versus conduct distinction, see Wertheimer, supra
note 7.
61. 415 U.S. 130 (1974).
62. Id. at 134.
63. Id. at 135 (Powell, J., concurring).
64. Id.
65. 482 U.S. 451 (1987).
66. Id. at 454.
67. Id. (alteration in original).
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"Yes, why don't you pick on somebody my size?"68 Hill was
charged under an ordinance for "willfully or intentionally
interrupt[ing] a city policeman.., by verbal challenge during an
69
investigation" but was later acquitted of the charges.
Hill then filed suit in federal court asking, in part, for a
declaratory judgment finding the ordinance unconstitutional
and requesting a
permanent
injunction against its
enforcement. 70 The district court found that the ordinance, as
applied, was not unconstitutional. 71 The Fifth Circuit reversed,
72
holding that the ordinance was facially overbroad.
The Supreme Court agreed, adopting Justice Powell's
rationale and holding "in the face of verbal challenges to police
action, officers and municipalities must respond with
restraint."73 Further, the Court held that freedom to oppose
police action without risking arrest "is one of the principle
characteristics by which we distinguish a free nation from a
police state," and that "a certain amount of expressive disorder
not only is inevitable in a society committed to individual
freedom, but must itself be protected if that freedom would
survive." 74 The Court was also disturbed by the concept that
ordinances such as the one promulgated by the City of Houston
allowed the police too much discretion to arrest due to the
content of the speech, or "to arrest the speaker rather than to
75
correct the conditions about which he complains."
While the Court had previously reversed convictions based
on fighting words addressed to or about law enforcement
officials, 76 for the first time the Court recognized the fighting
words doctrine may necessitate separate analysis when the
words are directed to a police officer. Since Hill, the Court has
neither reaffirmed nor overturned its analysis concerning
application of the fighting words doctrine in the context of law
enforcement.

68. Id.
69. Id. at 454-55 (alteration in original).
70. Id. at 455.
71. Hill, 482 U.S. at 455-56.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 471.
74. Id. at 462-63, 472.
75. Id. at 466 n.15.
76. See, e.g., Gooding, 405 U.S. 518; Lewis, 415 U.S. 130; Brown v. Oklahoma, 408
U.S. 914 (1972).
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D. Ninth CircuitInterpretationin Poocha
On August 29, 1999, two Yosemite National Park Service
rangers attempted to make an arrest in a group of thirty to fifty
spectators, including Mr. Poocha. 77 After one of the rangers
instructed Poocha to leave, he allegedly responded "fuck you"
with his chest stuck out and fists clenched. 78 Poocha was not
immediately arrested but, instead, was charged with disorderly
conduct the next day for "us[ing] language in a matter [sic] that
was likely to incite an immediate breach of the peace while the
Ranger was trying to assist other Rangers in attempting to
make an arrest" and for disobeying a lawful order. 79 The
Federal District Court Judge found Poocha guilty and sentenced
80
him to twelve months probation and ten days in custody.
Poocha appealed his conviction to the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals which overturned it, finding Poocha's statement was
speech protected by the First Amendment and that it did not
81
constitute fighting words.
The Ninth Circuit relied on Hill's context-oriented
reasoning that properly trained police officers are expected to
show more restraint and are less likely to react belligerently
8 2
than the average citizen when confronted with fighting words.
The court further reasoned that the fighting words doctrine
must be more narrowly applied concerning remarks made to a
law enforcement official due to "the constitutional shield [that
protects] criticism of official conduct."8 3 The fact that Poocha's
speech also included "aggressive gestures" was inconsequential
to the court and did not affect the ruling that Poocha's
84
statement was protected by the First Amendment.
Finally, the Ninth Circuit suggested that there may be no
fighting words exception when the speech targets public officials
such as law enforcement. The court stated that application of
the fighting words exception is narrowest, "if indeed it exists at

77. United States v. Poocha, 259 F.3d 1077, 1078 (2001).
78. Id. at 1079.
79. Id. (alteration in original); see also 36 C.F.R. § 2.34(a)(2) (2002).
80. Poocha, 259 F.3d at 1079.
81. Id. at 1082.
82. Id. at 1081.
83. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
273 (1964)).
84. Poocha, 259 F.3d at 1082.
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all, with respect to criminal prosecution for speech directed at
public officials."8 5 With its ruling, the Ninth Circuit affirmedand may have expanded upon-the concept that fighting words
spoken to the average citizen are generally not fighting words
when addressed to police officers.
E. History of the Fighting Words Doctrine in Montana
The Montana Supreme Court had its first substantive
exposure to the fighting words doctrine in City of Whitefish v.
O'Shaughnessy, two years prior to the Hill decision.8 6 According
to Mr. O'Shaughnessy, he was walking down the street with two
other men and conversing in a manner louder than normal.8 7 A
police officer approached O'Shaughnessy and told him to "hold it
down."88 O'Shaughnessy and the officer had a conversation at
the end of which O'Shaughnessy said "in a friendly way, 'Give
me five, [f.'er].'"89
The officer's testimony differed from O'Shaughnessy's. The
officer testified that he told O'Shaughnessy to hold it down three
to five times and that he warned O'Shaughnessy he could be
arrested for disturbing the peace. 90
After being warned,
O'Shaughnessy got into the patrol car twice without
permission. 9 1 O'Shaughnessy then wanted to shake hands with
the officer. 92 The officer refused and O'Shaughnessy stated,
"Well [m.f.], I will holler and yell when and wherever I want if I
want to.... ."93
The officer arrested O'Shaughnessy for
disturbing the peace. 94 A jury found O'Shaughnessy guilty of
disturbing the peace and that the language constituted fighting
95
words.
O'Shaughnessy appealed his conviction to the Montana
Supreme Court. The court accepted the officer's version of the
events for purposes of appeal in that O'Shaughnessy stated
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 1081 (emphasis added).
216 Mont. 433, 704 P.2d 1021 (1985).
Id., 216 Mont. at 435, 704 P.2d at 1022.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
O'Shaughnessy, 216 Mont. at 436, 704 P.2d at 1023.
Id., 216 Mont. at 436, 704 P.2d at 1023 (alteration in original).
Id., 216 Mont. at 435, 704 P.2d at 1022 (alteration in original).
Id., 216 Mont. at 436, 704 P.2d at 1023 (alteration in original).
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"Well [m.f.], I will holler and yell when and wherever I want if I
want to.. ."96 It found that O'Shaughnessy's speech constituted
fighting words as construed by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Chaplinsky, and that "by definition a threat of violence or threat
of violent response was present" due to O'Shaughnessy's
97
words.
Justice Hunt, however, dissented using the same rationale
that Justice Powell used in Lewis. Justice Hunt reasoned that
"[wihen an officer of the law, as a public servant, approaches a
citizen and the latter becomes irate for some reason and
unleashes some verbal abuse, no arrest should be made on that
basis alone," and that an officer should be able to take an insult
98
with a "grain of salt."
The Montana Supreme Court has had little occasion to
doctrine
since
words
the
fighting
further
examine
O'Shaughnessy was decided. 99 The court has used Chaplinsky
and the fighting words doctrine to stand for the proposition that
not all speech is protected, but has not expended significant
attention to the doctrine. 10 0
F. Application of FightingWords Doctrine to Law Enforcement
in Other States
It is a general rule that the fighting words doctrine will be
applied more narrowly to police officers because they are
expected to use more restraint than average citizens. 1 1 The

96. Id., 216 Mont. at 437-38, 704 P.2d at 1024; see also State v. Meader, 184 Mont. 32,
43, 601 P.2d 386, 392 (1979) (holding on appeal from a criminal jury trial, evidence is
viewed most favorable to the State).
97. O'Shaughnessy, 216 Mont. at 438-39, 704 P.2d at 1024.
98. Id., 216 Mont. at 444, 704 P.2d at 1028 (Hunt, J., dissenting).
99. The only case where the fighting words doctrine was specifically at issue involved
calling a man "a communist government worker, no good son-of-a-bitch, chickenshit, and
m ----r" and stating 'Fight me. Hit me" which the court easily found within the fighting
words exception as "words that have a direct tendency to violence." City of Billings v.
Batten, 218 Mont. 64, 67, 69, 705 P.2d 1120, 1122, 1124 (1985) (alteration in original).
100. See, e.g., State v. Cooney, 271 Mont. 42, 48, 894 P.2d 303, 307 (1995); State v.
Helfrich, 277 Mont. 452, 460, 922 P.2d 1159, 1164 (1996); City of Columbia Falls v.
Bennett, 247 Mont. 298, 299-301, 806 P.2d 25, 26-27 (1991) (holding that although the
defendant called a citizen a "son of a bitch" and a "bastard" and told a police officer
"You're fucking out of line. You've done it this time, you're fucked," the court did not need
to apply the fighting words doctrine because fighting words were not part of the charging
document or a jury instruction); State v. Lance, 222 Mont. 92, 102, 721 P.2d 1258, 1265
(1986).
101. 12 AM. JUR. 2D Breach of Peace and Disorderly Conduct § 12 (1997).
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states, however, have taken different interpretations on how
narrowly that application will be construed as they have tried to
strike a balance between the competing interests of civility and
10 2
freedom of expression.
In Mississippi, telling a police officer "I'm tired of this God
dpolice sticking their nose in s- that doesn't even involve
In
them" did not rise to the level of fighting words. 10 3
" to a police officer was
Pennsylvania, stating "F_ you, a
also not considered fighting words because it is expected that
officers are exposed to emotionally charged events on a daily
basis. 10 4 In Oklahoma, a woman stating, "You're such an ass"
and "You mother f-ers, you can't-you're not brave enough to
go out and catch murders and robbers. You are a couple of
pussies" to two police officers did not involve fighting words due
Likewise,
to the increased restraint officers must use. 10 5
swearing at an officer and calling him "a pig" did not constitute
10 6
fighting words in Illinois.
However, in Maine, calling court security officers "fucking
assholes" and attempting to spit on one of them was held to be
fighting words. 10 7 In Florida, calling a police officer a "pussyassed mother fucker" can be fighting words. 0 8 In Indiana,
telling a police officer to "get the fuck away" and calling him a
"lying mother-fucker" constitutes fighting words. 10 9 In Ohio,
there is no distinction between fighting words directed at police
officers versus those directed at the general public." 0
Even within some states there have been different rulings
on application of the fighting words doctrine depending on the
severity of the conduct involved. For example, in Minnesota, a
fourteen year-old girl stating "fuck you pigs" to two police

102. Robert M. O'Neil, Rights in Conflict: The FirstAmendment's Third Century, 65
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 21 (Spring 2002).
103. Brendle v. City of Houston, 759 So. 2d 1274 (2000) (alteration in original).
104. Pennsylvania v. Hock, 728 A.2d 943 (1999) (alteration in original).
105. Harrington v. City of Tulsa, 763 P.2d 700 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988) (alteration in
original).
106. City of Chicago v. Blakemore, 305 N.E.2d 687, 688 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973) ("[olffensive
language addressed to an officer does not, in, and of itself, create a disturbance of the
peace.").
107. State v. York, 732 A.2d 859 (Me. 1999).
108. L.J.M. v. State, 541 So. 2d 1321 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
109. Robinson v. State, 588 N.E.2d 533 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992).
110. City of Akron v. Bozic, No. 20351, 2001 WL 1240137 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 17, 2001)
(unpublished decision).
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officers fifteen to thirty feet away in their squad car was held
not to constitute fighting words, but a later case held that
calling a police officer "white racist motherf* *ker" and telling
that same officer and another that he "wished their mothers
would die" did rise to the level of fighting words."'
Although Hill was decided over fifteen years ago, it is
apparent that states are reaching disturbingly different results
based on the same general conduct.
III. THE ROBINSON CASE
A. Facts and Lower Court Decisions
Malachi Robinson was crossing an intersection in Missoula,
Montana around midnight on October 8, 2000, with several
other pedestrians. 112 Missoula County Sheriffs Deputy David
McGinnis was stopped at the traffic light at the same
intersection in a marked patrol car." 3 As Robinson crossed the
street, he glared at Officer McGinnis and stated "fucking pig,"
causing several of the pedestrians to move away." 4 Officer
McGinnis parked his patrol car, approached Robinson and told
him "he now had my attention and asked him if there was
anything he wanted to talk about."11 5 Robinson replied, "Fuck
of the
off, asshole" and was arrested under section 45-8-101
16
Montana Code Annotated, for disorderly conduct.
In Justice Court, Robinson filed a motion to dismiss,
contending that his words were protected as free speech under
the United States and Montana Constitutions. 1 7 The court
denied his motion and Robinson pled nolo contendere, reserving
his right to appeal the denial."18 Robinson received a ten-day

111. Compare In re S.L.J., 263 N.W.2d 412 (Minn. 1978), with State v. Clay, No. CX99-343, 1999 WL 711038 (Minn. App. Sept. 14, 1999) (calling officer "white racist
motherf* *ker" was not fighting words but wishing death upon mothers was) (alteration
in original) (unpublished decision).
112. Robinson, 3.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. T 4.
116. Id.
117. Id. 5.
118. Robinson, 9 5.
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suspended sentence and was fined $100 with $50 suspended. 119
Robinson petitioned the district court for review of the
denial of his motion. 120 On appeal, Robinson did not seek to
have the conviction overturned on state constitutional grounds,
but only sought review under the U.S. Constitution.' 2 1 The
district court also found against Robinson, holding that his
"speech had a direct tendency to violence, as it met the
definition of fighting words."1 22 Robinson appealed to the
Montana Supreme Court, again seeking redress solely under the
123
U.S. Constitution.
B. Majority Holding
Justice Leaphart, writing for the majority, began with a
tacit attack on the maturity of Robinson's conduct, asking
whether the court needed to determine if Robinson should have
been tried as a juvenile rather than as an adult. 124 He followed
by outlining the definition of fighting words as it had been
construed by the court's previous decisions. Specifically, the
court defined fighting words as those that "inflict injury or tend
to incite an immediate breach of peace" or those that "have a
direct tendency to violence."1 25 The court cited Hill, but only
insofar as Hill noted that speech is protected "unless shown
likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious
substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience,
annoyance, or unrest."1 26 The court did not, however, cite Hill
for the proposition that a narrower application of the fighting
words doctrine applies in instances involving police officers. The
court also recognized the ruling established in Poocha, but held
that pursuant to the Supremacy Clause they were not required
127
to follow its precedent.
The court compared Robinson's situation with that
previously encountered in O'Shaughnessy in that Robinson used
119. Id.
120. Id. 6.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. 8.
124. Robinson, $ 7. Robinson was 20 years old at the time of the incident.
125. Id.
12 (quoting O'Shaughnessy, 216 Mont. at 438, 704 P.2d at 1024 and Batten,
218 Mont. at 69, 705 P.2d at 1124).
126. Robinson, 12.
127. Id. H9113-15.
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the same expletive as O'Shaughnessy.' 28
Based on the
129
similarities, the court found O'Shaughnessy to be controlling.
It also questioned the logic in Poocha, finding that the
determination of whether verbal action constitutes fighting
words should not depend on the intended recipient, including
police officers. 130 The majority reasoned if they were to adopt a
rationale that the recipient of the remarks should be considered,
"any troglodyte could wander the streets calling young children
and old men 'fT * * * * * pigs' because, due to their age or
infirmity, they, like the well-trained policeman, will not be able
13
to respond in a violent fashion." '
The majority admitted that if the statements had been
made at a protest or political rally it may have raised issues of
free speech.' 32 However, the court was unwilling to hold that
goading an officer with Robinson's words "adds to our
constitutionally-protected social discourse."1 33 While the police
are expected to use more restraint than the general public, that
same public should not be allowed to "gratuitously test that
restraint without fear of being charged with disorderly
conduct." 34 The court also reaffirmed the position it took in
O'Shaughnessy that words such as Robinson's are of such "slight
social value" that their benefits are "clearly outweighed by the
social interest in order and morality." 135 The court concluded
"outside the confines of a sty, T* * * * * * pig' qualifies as
sufficiently and inherently inflammatory, irrespective of the
intended audience." 136
C. Dissent
Justice Cotter dissented from the opinion and was joined by
Chief Justice Gray. Justice Cotter believed O'Shaughnessy was
distinguishable from the facts in Robinson for several reasons.
O'Shaughnessy's conduct was more severe than Robinson's in

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id.
20.
Id.
Id.
21.
Id. (alteration in original).
Robinson, 22.
Id.
Id.
Id.
23.
Id.
24 (alteration in original).
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that O'Shaughnessy was given multiple warnings by the officer
to cease his behavior, entered the officer's car on two occasions
and threatened further disobedience of the officer's orders "in a
direct and personally abusive manner." 137
In contrast,
Robinson's comment was from a sidewalk to a police officer
sitting in his car. 138 The dissent further questioned the actions
of Officer McGinnis in escalating the situation by getting out of
his car and challenging Robinson to make further remarks. 39
Had the officer left, the dissent argued, the confrontation would
40
never have occurred.
The dissent also questioned the majority's reasoning that it
should make no difference whether the remarks are addressed
to a police officer because "'young children and old men'.., are
neither trained nor obligated to keep the peace" while police
officers are so trained and obligated.' 4 '
Accordingly, the
dissenting judges agreed with the Ninth Circuit's rationale in
Poocha that trained officers should "be expected to exercise a
higher degree of restraint than the average citizen." 142
V. ANALYSIS
There is no doubt that Robinson's remarks were offensive
and inappropriate irrespective of the recipient. There is also no
fault with the Montana Supreme Court's attempt to protect law
enforcement from verbal assault.
The Robinson decision,
however, is faulty on several fronts.
The court relies on
factually distinguishable and outdated precedent. It also fails to
recognize inherent distinctions between the effect derogatory
remarks will have when spoken to the general public versus
those same words when spoken to a police officer. Further, the
court did not rely on factual differences between Robinson and
Hill which may have led to a legally defensible position. Finally,
the court used its decision to inappropriately denigrate the
defendant.
The majority's considerable reliance on O'Shaughnessy is
misplaced.
The same expletive may have been used in

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id. 29 (Cotter, J., dissenting).
Robinson, 29 (Cotter, J., dissenting).
Id.
30.
Id.
Id. 31.
Id. (quoting Poocha, 259 F.3d at 1081).
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O'Shaughnessy and Robinson. The conduct, however, was
significantly different. O'Shaughnessy approached the officer by
stating "Give me five, [f.'er]," was told to quiet his hollering
three to five times, escalated the encounter by getting into the
police car twice without being asked to do so, called the officer a
"[m.f.]" after the officer refused to shake hands, and told the
officer he would "holler and yell when and wherever I want if I
want to."1 43 By contrast, Robinson called the officer a "fucking
pig" from several feet away while the officer was in his car
waiting to cross at a streetlight, and only told the officer "Fuck
off, asshole" after the officer challenged Robinson about his
remark. 144 As the dissent noted in O'Shaughnessy, "[w]ith the
words spoken in retreat from more than 15 feet away rather
than eye-to-eye, there was no reasonable likelihood that they
would tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace or to
provoke violent reaction by an ordinary, reasonable person,"
145
much less a violent reaction by a police officer.
More importantly, O'Shaughnessy was decided two years
before the U.S. Supreme Court announced in Hill that the
fighting words doctrine requires separate application when
those words are spoken to a police officer. As noted, the majority
did cite to Hill. It did not, however, follow Hill's stated
mandate. Nor did it follow its reasoning that freedom to
verbally oppose police action without risking arrest "is one of the
principal characteristics by which we distinguish a free nation
from a police state." 146 Accordingly, the majority ignored the
principle holding in Hill and chose to use outdated analysis.
There is no fault in the court's conclusion that it is not
required to follow the precedent established in Poocha. Federal
courts have generally held that their state counterparts are
under no obligation to follow precedent established in federal
district and circuit courts. 4 7 However, those same courts are

143. O'Shaughnessy, 216 Mont. at 435-36, 704 P.2d at 1022-23 (alterations in original).
144. Robinson, 3-4. Justice Cotter also dissented on the basis that O'Shaughnessy
was convicted by a jury where the evidence is reviewed on appeal in a manner most
favorable to the state. Robinson, however, was not convicted by a jury in which case the
legal analysis is conducted de novo. Id. 28 (Cotter, J., dissenting).
145. O'Shaughnessy, 216 Mont. at 446, 704 P.2d at 1029 (Hunt, J., dissenting) (quoting
S.L.J., 263 N.W.2d at 420).
146. Hill, 482 U.S. at 463.
147. See generally Freeman v. Lane, 962 F.2d 1252, 1258 (7th Cir. 1992); Bromley v.
Crisp, 561 F.2d 1351, 1354 (10th Cir. 1977); Owsley v. Peyton, 352 F.2d 804, 805 (4th
Cir. 1965).
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cognizant that the lack of recognition state courts may utilize for
federal court precedent only applies until the U.S. Supreme
148 It is
Court makes a binding decision on the issue in question.
axiomatic that the highest court of a state must give deference
to decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court on federal Constitutional
49
issues and follow its mandates.
With respect to the facts at issue in Robinson, the U.S.
Supreme Court has so spoken. It declared that a narrower
interpretation of the fighting words doctrine applies when the
words are spoken to a police officer.' 5 0 Although other states
have rendered decisions conflicting with this mandate,' 5' it does
not excuse the Montana Supreme Court's failure to follow U.S.
Supreme Court precedent on issues of U.S. Constitutional law.
Failure to recognize and follow the mandates of the Supreme
Court weakens its decisions as well as the court's respect within
the judiciary and the bar. 15 2 It also undermines the integrity of
the judicial hierarchy. 153
The decision in Robinson may
contribute to just such a result. Moreover, even if the U.S.
Supreme Court had not spoken on the issue, the disparity of
rulings in Poocha and Robinson will lead to inconsistent results
depending on whether a case comes before a federal court in the
Ninth Circuit or a Montana state court, and depending on
whether the words are spoken to a federal officer or a Montana
state officer.
Another failure of the Robinson majority was to improperly
reason that there is no practical distinction between fighting
words spoken to a police officer and those spoken to the general
public. By its ruling, the court did not explicitly do away with
any distinction between the content of fighting words and the
conduct, or context, with which they are related. However, by
concluding that "f** * * * * pig" can be construed as fighting

148. Bromley, 561 F.2d at 1354; Owsley, 352 F.2d at 805.
149. Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 335 (1946) ("[tJhe Constitution has imposed
upon this Court final authority to determine the meaning and application of those words
of that instrument which require interpretation to resolve judicial issues"); Elmendorf v.
Taylor, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 152, 160 (1825) ("the construction given by this Court to the
constitution and laws of the United States is received by all as the true construction");
see also 20 AM. JUR. 2D Courts § 170 (1995).

150. Hill, 482 U.S. at 462, 471.
151. See supra notes 106-110 and accompanying text.
152. Thomas J. Long, Deciding Whether Conflicts With Supreme Court Precedent
WarrantCertiorari,59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1104, 1106 (1984).
153. Id.
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words "irrespective of the intended audience," the court
suggested such distinctions are less important than the U.S.
Supreme Court previously found in Hill.154 At minimum, the
holding established that any content versus conduct distinction
is irrelevant in Montana as it relates to police officers.
The Robinson majority conclude that if they were to decide
otherwise, anyone could call "young children and old men T* * *
* * * pigs'" because the recipient has no means to respond
violently. 155 The term "pigs" has a specific derogatory meaning
with respect to police officers. Calling an average person a
"fucking pig" denotes more about their dietary habits than their
repressive tendencies. Addressing the same language to a police
officer questions whether the recipient uses their authority in a
restrictive and arbitrary fashion. In addition, and as noted by
the dissent, the young and the infirm are not trained to face
derogatory language.1 56 Police officers are so trained and are
expected to be more restrained in the face of derogatory
remarks. Nor do the young and the infirm generally encounter
potentially volatile and antagonistic behavior on a daily basis.
It can be argued that the restraint mentioned by the dissent is
more appropriately the restraint not to respond with violence
but instead to use other means such as arrest. However, it is
the potential for violence that is at the heart of the fighting
words exception.
In Chaplinsky, the U.S. Supreme Court
established that fighting words are those causing "an average
addressee to fight."1 5 7 In Hill, the Court held that police officers
are not average addressees but, instead, due to their training
and the special circumstances of their duties are less likely to
fight than the average addressee when faced with vulgar or
derogatory remarks. 158 Inherent in the concept of fighting words
is the notion that the recipient of the words will respond with
violence. Accordingly, if there is no likelihood of a fight in
response to a verbal assault, by definition there are no fighting
words. With no likelihood of a fight due to the special training
and experience of a police officer, Hill established that the
fighting words exception requires a separate analysis when

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Robinson, 24 (alteration in original).
Id. 21 (alteration in original).
Id. 31 (Cotter, J., dissenting).
Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573.
Hill, 482 U.S. at 462.
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offensive language is directed to them.
Hill notwithstanding, the U.S. Supreme Court has rejected
reasoning comporting with the notion that insulting language
should be fighting words irrespective of the recipient.
In
Gooding, the State of Georgia argued that its breach of the peace
statute was not overly broad because it applied the fighting
words concept to language tending to provoke violent
resentment in the recipient. 159 The Supreme Court, finding
otherwise, cited to Georgia appellate court decisions holding
that a breach of the peace could occur if fighting words are
spoken on the opposite side of a raging stream, to someone
locked in a jail cell, or to those who "on account of circumstances
or obligations imposed by office" may not be able to respond with
violence at the time. 160 The Court found this notion too broad as
there was "no likelihood that the person addressed would make
an immediate violent response." 16 1 Accordingly, although the
language may be inappropriate, the Montana Supreme Court's
reasoning concerning application of the fighting words exception
to insulting language spoken toward "young children and old
men" is as misplaced as was the reasoning of the Georgia
appellate courts.
The Montana Supreme Court also missed a potential
opportunity to ground its result on a legally rational basis. In
Hill, the U.S. Supreme Court based its result, in part, on the
fundamental freedom to "challenge police action without thereby
risking arrest" and that officers must respond with restraint "in
the face of verbal challenges to police action.' 62 The defendant
in Hill was challenging what he perceived to be police efforts to
detain one of his friends. 163 By contrast, in Robinson there is no
indication that the defendant was challenging any action by the
police. 64 Therefore, there was no political or free speech motive
to the words since Robinson was simply offering gratuitous
profane insults to the officer and not challenging any action the
officer was taking. The court did note Robinson's words were

159. Gooding, 405 U.S. at 525.
160. Id. at 525-26 (citing Elmore v. State, 83 S.E. 799 (Ga. Ct. App. 1914)).
161. Id. at 528.
162. Hill, 482 U.S. at 462, 471 (emphasis added).
163. Id. at 453-54.
164. In 2002, Robinson received a 36 month sentence for possession of drugs and drug
paraphernalia. Judgment, State v. Robinson, No. DC-99-13833 (Missoula Dist. Ct. filed
Sept. 3, 2002). However, his previous conviction was not raised as in issue in the record.
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not uttered at a protest or political rally and that they did not
add to constitutionally protected discourse, but it did not
distinguish the fact that Robinson was not protesting a specific
police act. 165 That said, any decision by the court to do so may
not have changed the inconsistency of its result with that of Hill.
However, at the very least the court's decision would have had
some basis with which to distinguish the facts of Robinson with
those of Hill.
Finally, the majority's disparaging remarks and personal
attack against Mr. Robinson are troubling.
The opinion
questioned Robinson's maturity by asking whether he should
have been tried as a juvenile, indicated that Robinson
"stretch[ed] his vocabulary to its fullest" extent when he said
"Fuck off, asshole," tacitly called Robinson a "troglodyte," and
indicated that Robinson's words had no place "outside the
confines of a sty."166 The court is well within its discretion in
using judicial ink to suggest that certain behavior is
inappropriate. The extent to which the majority demeaned
Robinson does not, however, reflect positively on the court. In
Estate of Miles v. Miles, the court noted that rules of professional
conduct prohibit antagonistic behavior by attorneys and that the
court will "not tolerate derogatory comments or personal attacks
upon other attorneys, their clients, or the judiciary." 167 The
court went on to chastise one of the attorneys in the case for his
personal attacks and told him that "[hie must understand that
professionalism, civility and zealous advocacy are not mutually
exclusive concepts." 168 While there are no binding rules in
Montana governing the conduct of judges, the majority would do
well to heed its own words. In addition, the statute under which
Robinson was convicted makes it a misdemeanor for disturbing
the peace by using abusive language. 169 The language used by
the majority to condemn Robinson may well fit within that
prohibition. Thus, the court may want to consider the way it
uses judicial ink to criticize in the future lest it be impaled on its
own sword.

165. Robinson, 22.
166. Id. T 4, 7, 21, 24.
167. 2000 MT 41, 61, 298 Mont. 312,
168. Id.
169.

16, 994 P.2d 1139, T 16.

MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-101(1)(c) (2003).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Montana Supreme Court's decision in Robinson fails in
several respects. It relies on outdated and inapplicable Montana
precedent. It fails to recognize the practical distinction between
fighting words spoken to a police officer and fighting words
spoken to an average addressee.
It used its position to
disparage a party to the case. Most importantly, it failed to
follow the mandates of the U.S. Supreme Court. In Hill, the
Supreme Court ruled that because a police officer is not likely to
fight in response to verbal provocation, by definition there can
be no fighting words. Unless and until the Supreme Court
overturns Hill, it is the duty of lower courts to follow the Court's
ruling on issues of U.S. Constitutional law and not rely on
outdated precedent.
We are all free to question whether the rationale of Hill is
appropriate.
Indeed, there are few among us who would
commend Robinson's vulgar remarks. There are also few among
us who would blame a police officer for being offended by them
and arresting the offender, or blame a prosecutor for advocating
the necessity of prosecution. Incivility toward our fellow citizens
denigrates society as a whole. Incivility toward the police and
challenges to their authority causes a loss of respect for laws
and reduces police effectiveness. In extreme circumstances,
incivility may indeed lead to a breach of the peace.
However, limitations on free speech under the U.S.
Constitution are not for the general public to decide, nor is it the
place of the Montana Supreme Court to do so when the U.S.
Supreme Court has spoken. When the Supreme Court rules
upon areas within its province the lower courts must follow. As
the ultimate arbiter of First Amendment free speech, the
Supreme Court unequivocally held that the fighting words
doctrine requires a narrower interpretation when the words are
spoken to a police officer. By holding that there is no distinction
between words spoken to a member of the general public and a
police officer, the Montana Supreme Court has broken from this
mandate. Just as incivility toward police officers causes a lack
of respect for their authority, failing to follow the edicts of the
U.S. Supreme Court lessens the Court's ability to determine the
supreme law of the land, and the Montana Supreme Court was
misguided in doing so.
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